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The Public Wrong of Whistleblower Retaliation
DAVID KWOK*
When employers retaliate against whistleblowers, courts and agencies often treat the
retaliation as a private employment dispute best resolved by the whistleblower and
employer. This cramped view of retaliation disregards Congress’s contrary
perspective of whistleblower retaliation as a public wrong requiring public attention.
A survey of disparate Congressional enforcement mechanisms in whistleblower
retaliation reveals common ground in a public mandate to investigate retaliation
allegations. As limited resources constrain public investigation of every allegation,
this Article proposes legislative and enforcement strategies that affirm the
government’s leadership role in addressing the public wrong of whistleblower
retaliation.

* J.D., Ph.D., Assistant Professor, University of Houston Law Center. I thank Gerry Moohr,
Sandra Sperino, Stacy Hawkins, Dave Fagundes, Joanna Grossman, Natalie Nanasi, Bradley Areheart,
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Journal in preparing this piece. Remaining errors are mine alone.
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INTRODUCTION
The popular media may praise whistleblowers for their roles in
revealing wrongdoing, but private employees run the serious risk of
employer retaliation when they choose to blow the whistle on employer
wrongdoing.1 Over the last century, Congress has enacted numerous
statutes directing agencies to protect whistleblowers against retaliation
in diverse contexts such as securities fraud, asbestos, and solid waste
disposal.2 This delegation of responsibility to enforce antiretaliation
statutes suggests that Congress recognizes the public importance of
protecting whistleblowers.
The behavior of courts and agencies, however, instead emphasizes
retaliation as a private employment dispute. The Secretary of Labor has
been extremely reluctant to actually litigate whistleblower retaliation
cases,3 and courts have limited antiretaliation efforts by expressly
disclaiming the public interest angle.4

1. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., OSHA
Orders Wells Fargo to Reinstate Whistleblower, Fully Restore Lost Earnings in Banking Industry (Apr.
3, 2017), https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/national/04032017 (covering the termination of
a bank manager who reported potentially fraudulent behavior); Ann Marsh, Unprotected: How the
Feds Failed Two Wells Fargo Whistleblowers, AM. BANKER (Aug. 14 2017, 8:35 PM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/unprotected-how-the-feds-failed-two-wells
-fargo-whistleblowers (criticizing OSHA’s mishandling of two whistleblower cases in the banking
industry); Tom Hamburger, Questioning the Books: Enron Memo Shows Watkins Urged Lay to
Restate Earnings, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2002, at A8. See generally Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus &
Chockalingan Viswesvaran, Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of
Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions, and Retaliation, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 277 (2005) (analyzing whether
intentions of whistleblowers corresponds with whistleblowers’ actions).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See, e.g., TOM DEVINE & TAREK F. MAASSARANI, THE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER’S SURVIVAL
GUIDE: A HANDBOOK FOR COMMITTING THE TRUTH 166 (2011) (providing that, as of 2011, the
Department of Labor has only filed suit in section 11(c) occupational safety whistleblower cases thirtytwo times in fifteen years); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection:
A Tale of Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN. L. R EV. 183, 199-200 (2007) (indicating that more
Sarbanes-Oxley complaints are dismissed than decided on the merits); Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX
and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. R EV. 1757, 1764 (2007) (submitting that the ineffective of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is illustrated by the lack of cases brought under it); OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH ADMIN., WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATION DATA CASES RECEVIED: FY2007-FY2017 (2017),
http://www.whistleblowers.gov/sites/default/files/3DCharts-FY2007-FY20
17.pdf (providing statistics for fiscal years 2007 through 2017).
4. See, e.g., Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 383 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The primary purpose of
[this whistleblower] statute is to provide a private remedy for the aggrieved employee, not to publicize
alleged corporate misconduct.”); Oldroyd v. Elmira Sav. Bank, FSB, 134 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1998)
(finding that the availability of litigation in a whistleblower statute does not stand for the proposition
that Congress did not intend to preclude resolution through arbitration).
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The core problem is incoherent delegation of whistleblower
retaliation responsibility from Congress in light of limited enforcement
resources. Congress might sincerely desire thorough investigation and
enforcement of all whistleblower retaliation claims by the Secretary of
Labor, but insufficient resources make this impossible. Combined with
numerous statutes that specify disparate enforcement responsibilities, it
is unsurprising that the Secretary would simply assume that most
whistleblower retaliation cases could be adequately addressed through
private litigation rather than public agency litigation.
In the short term, the Secretary can re-establish the public
importance of whistleblower retaliation cases by candidly acknowledging
public resource limitations and shifting enforcement priorities. Rather
than futilely investigating every retaliation allegation to completion, the
Secretary should instead prioritize investigating the public interest in
each allegation. A formal announcement that an allegation merits public
attention can dissuade courts from viewing the complaint as a purely
private matter.
As a broader solution, this Article proposes a principal-agent view of
whistleblower antiretaliation litigation that can lead towards coherent
delegation of antiretaliation efforts for various offenses. Borrowing from
recent interest in whistleblower bounties, this principal-agent view
emphasizes the linkage between the public interest in discovering
wrongdoing and the whistleblower’s private interest.5 Most
whistleblower statutes do not offer payment for whistleblowing, but there
are a few exceptions, including the False Claims Act and Dodd-Frank.6
Bounties paid under those statutes link the private agent’s interests with
the public interest in uncovering the wrongdoing by paying a percentage
of the penalty to the whistleblower. Whistleblowers who uncover severe
wrongdoing are entitled to a greater reward, while whistleblowers who
reveal trivial wrongdoing receive little reward. The reward system drives
whistleblowers towards the public’s interest in prioritizing severe
wrongdoing.
Antiretaliation efforts on behalf of whistleblowers should follow a
similar analytical framework. The public, as the principal, has an interest
in uncovering different types of wrongdoing. The whistleblower, as the

5. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Reconceptualizing the Whistleblower’s Dilemma, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 2215 (2017) (discussing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s whistleblowing program);
Kathleen Clark & Nancy J. Moore, Financial Rewards for Whistleblowing Lawyers, 56 B.C. L. REV.
1697 (2015) (analyzing whether attorneys are allowed to seek federal whistleblower awards); Dennis
J. Ventry, Jr., Stitches for Snitches: Lawyers as Whistleblowers, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1455 (2017)
(challenging the argument that an attorney cannot expose a client’s wrongdoing without also violating
her ethical obligations).
6. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
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agent, faces a disincentive to reveal wrongdoing due to the risk of
employer retaliation. Her potential losses due to retaliation, however,
may not be aligned with the public’s interest in uncovering the
wrongdoing. In fact, they may be inversely related: If the whistleblower
is revealing serious wrongdoing in which there is a strong public interest,
her employer is more likely to retaliate against her, which could make her
less likely to come forward.
Congress, therefore, should consider the whistleblower’s interests in
the substantive wrongdoing in comparison with the public’s interest. If
her interest in the wrongdoing matches the public’s interest, then she
should be a desirable agent for the principal: she can be trusted to both
blow the whistle and to subsequently enforce a private right against
employer retaliation for revealing the wrongdoing. An Occupational
Safety and Health Administration of the Department of Labor (“OSHA”)
violation dealing with workplace safety would be an example: an
employee working in an unsafe factory floor has an interest in improving
safety that matches the public’s interest in workplace safety. This
employee can be trusted to blow the whistle and to bring a private action
against retaliation for blowing the whistle on the OSHA violation.
Contrary to the existing statute, which requires OSHA to litigate the
retaliation claim, this is a retaliation claim that Congress should feel
comfortable delegating to the employee for litigation.
In contrast, a potential whistleblower might uncover facts possibly
implying that her employer has been systematically underpaying federal
taxes. The government, representing the public, has an interest in
collecting taxes, but in this scenario, it is less clear that the potential
employee whistleblower’s interest aligns well with the government’s
interest. A deficient agent, for example, might raise questionable claims
of tax wrongdoing because she desires greater leverage in negotiating a
severance package rather than sincere beliefs about tax underpayment.
There is a greater possibility here that the agent’s claims on both the
wrongdoing and subsequent retaliation might be suspect. Because the
whistleblower may not be as good of an agent in this tax scenario in
comparison to the workplace safety scenario, the government should
prioritize control over enforcement of this tax antiretaliation litigation.
This framework not only helps Congress and agencies decide which
retaliation cases to prioritize for government enforcement, but also
improves the form of delegation to employees for litigation. This Article
argues that Congress can improve delegation to employees by aligning
the employee’s interest with the public interest against retaliation: when
the substantive offense is serious, there should be greater compensation
available to the employee if she faces retaliation. Presently, most statutes
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limit employee compensation for retaliation to back pay and restitution,
but there is little reason to believe that an employee’s salary has any
direct relationship to the severity of the harm she is reporting. The public
interest is strongest in uncovering serious wrongdoing, and these cases
of serious wrongdoing similarly require strong investment in combating
retaliation. Future whistleblowers that know of serious wrongdoing must
be assured that they will have a fair chance if their employers choose to
retaliate.
Part I provides background on the federal whistleblower laws
regarding retaliation, highlighting Congress’s general emphasis on public
enforcement. Part II outlines evidence of the problematic private view of
whistleblower retaliation. Part III describes various strategies that will
restore the balance between public and private interests in retaliation.
I. BACKGROUND ON FEDERAL CIVIL
WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION CLAIMS
The United States has passed numerous laws concerning
whistleblower participation in correcting substantive wrongdoing: fraud
against the government,7 environmental violations,8 securities
violations,9 and others.10 The statutory regime is patchwork: only federal
employees benefit from a unified whistleblowing regime.11 Most federal
statutes attempt to protect whistleblowers by prohibiting retaliation
against the whistleblower. As a typical example, the International Safety
Container Act of 1977 (“ISCA”), which regulates shipping containers,
states that “[a] person may not discharge or discriminate against an
employee because the employee has reported the existence of an unsafe
container or a violation of this chapter or a regulation prescribed under

7. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
justice-department-recovers-nearly-6-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014 (pertaining to
the government’s recovery of a combined $5.69 billion from judgments and settlements in fraud
against the government cases).
8. For an overview of protections granted to environmental whistleblowers, see Richard E.
Condit, Providing Environmental Whistleblowers with Twenty-First Century Protections, 2 AM.
U. LAB. EMP. L.F. 31 (2011).
9. See, e.g., Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64
S.C. L. REV. 1 (2012) (examining the progress and shortcomings of whistleblower protection since the
passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ten years prior to publication).
10. For a survey of whistleblower laws, see Joel D. Hesch, Whistleblower Rights and Protections:
Critiquing Federal Whistleblower Laws and Recommending Filling in Missing Pieces to Form a
Beautiful Patchwork Quilt, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 51, 55 (2011).
11. The unified public enforcement of federal employee retaliation claims differs greatly from the
private sector system; as such, this Article will not discuss federal employee retaliation. See
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1989) and Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 et seq. (2012).
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this chapter.”12 Statutes generally offer only protection against retaliation
and do not offer any express rewards for whistleblowers, but there are a
handful of exceptions such as the False Claims Act13 and Dodd-Frank,14
which pay bounties to whistleblowers.
Society’s primary interest focuses on addressing a substantive
wrong, such as environmental pollution, and a whistleblower may help
identify such wrongdoing.15 The government wishes to deter substantive
offenses and to prosecute offenders, but there may be challenges in
learning about the offenses and the responsible parties. Whistleblowers
can supplement government investigation efforts. A potential
whistleblower, assuming she finds a federal statute covering her claim,
should consider whether she has any protection from employer
retaliation for blowing the whistle.
While this Article concerns federal whistleblower statutes, it is
important to note that there are other legal protections for
whistleblowers. The federal statutes may interact with state and common
law rights. Many states have passed a variety of whistleblower statutes,
and there is the possibility of federal preemption of state whistleblower
statutes.16 Additionally, there are common law rights regarding
retaliation against whistleblowers, particularly a public policy exception
to the traditional at-will employment rule.17 Federal statutory regimes
may similarly impact common-law rights.18
Although they are also outside the scope of this Article, there are
various federal statutes that criminalize retaliation against
whistleblowers. The government can refer the corporation and
individuals within for criminal sanctions such as obstruction of justice,19
witness tampering,20 or conspiracy charges.21 Sarbanes-Oxley, for
example, makes whistleblower retaliation a felony.22 The presence of

12. 46 U.S.C. § 80507(a) (2012).
13. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
15. See generally Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 375 (2011) (describing judicial interest in enforcing substantive law as the basis for
whistleblower retaliation decisions).
16. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower
Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 123–26 (2000).
17. See id. at 105; id. at 99, app. A.
18. Id. at 126–29.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2012).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (criminalizing defrauding the federal government). See generally
United States v. Gricco, 277 F.3d 339 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming defendants’ appeal of conspiracy and
tax invasion convictions).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2012).
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these criminal statutes also emphasize the public importance of
addressing retaliation. Nonetheless, the focus of this Article is on the role
of federal civil litigation in addressing whistleblower retaliation.
This Part begins with a summary of the typical elements to
antiretaliation litigation, and then turns its focus to Congress’s various
attempts to drive public enforcement of civil whistleblower retaliation
litigation.
A. ELEMENTS OF A WHISTLEBLOWER ANTIRETALIATION CLAIM
When a whistleblower believes she is facing retaliation from her
employer for her whistleblowing behavior, she may either bring a claim
to the OSHA or initiate a civil complaint in court. OSHA administratively
manages most whistleblower antiretaliation regimes, regardless of the
substantive area.23 Both avenues for potential redress proceed with a

23. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OSHA INSTRUCTION CPL 02-03-005, WHISTLEBLOWER
INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL, Ch. 1: VIII.D.1 (May 21, 2015), https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/
Directive_pdf/CPL_02-03-005.pdf
In addition to the overall responsibility of enforcing Section 11(c) of the Act, the Secretary of
Labor has delegated to OSHA the responsibility for investigating claims of retaliation filed by
employees under the whistleblower provisions of the following twenty-one statutes, which together
constitute the whistleblower protection program:
a.

Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA), 15 U.S.C. § 2651

b.

International Safe Container Act (ISCA), 46 U.S.C. § 80507

c.

Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA), 49 U.S.C. § 31105

d.

Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7622

e.

Comprehensive Environmental
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9610

f.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367

g.

Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300j–9(i)

h.

Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), 42 U.S.C. § 6971

i.

Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2622

j.

Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C. § 5851

k.

Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR21),
49 U.S.C. § 42121

l.

Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A

m.

Pipeline Safety Improvement Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60129

n.

Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. § 20109

o.

National Transit Systems Security Act (NTSSA), 6 U.S.C. § 1142

p.

Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2087

q.

Affordable Care Act (ACA), 29 U.S.C. § 218C

r.

Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFPA), Section 1057 of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. § 5567

s.

Seaman’s Protection Act, 46 U.S.C. § 2114 (SPA), as amended by Section 611 of the
Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, P.L. 111-281

Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act
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common analytical framework to determine whether a whistleblower
would be entitled to relief. After investigation, OSHA will make a
determination as to whether a whistleblower’s retaliation claim is
meritorious or not.24 Relief generally involves “making the victim whole”
through reinstatement, back pay, and litigation costs. Some statutes go
further by also authorizing punitive damages or other sanctions.25
A sample whistleblower retaliation case will help illustrate the
elements of a civil action. Dr. Julio Perez, a chemist at Progenics, faced
retaliation in connection with a drug called Relistor.26 Progenics had
completed a Phase 2 clinical trial of Relistor and was considering
proceeding to a Phase 3 clinical trial in May 2008.27 At that time, the
company issued a press release positively describing progress on
Relistor.28 Executives subsequently produced a high-level confidential
document that recommended not proceeding with a Phase 3 clinical trial
because of problems raised by the Phase 2 clinical trial results.29 Dr.
Perez obtained the executive document, and he expressed concerns to
superiors that the earlier press release was a “fraud against shareholders”
because the company knew that recent scientific studies of the drug were
disappointing.30 Shortly thereafter, Progenics fired Dr. Perez.31 Progenics
denied retaliating against Dr. Perez, claiming that Dr. Perez was fired
because he refused to disclose to superiors how he discovered the
executive document.32 On August 3, 2015, a federal jury found in favor of
Dr. Perez and ordered Progenics Pharmaceuticals to pay $1.66 million in
compensation.33

t.

FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), 21 U.S.C. § 399d

u.

Section 31307 of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21),
v.
49 U.S.C. § 30171.

24. Id. at 4-1 to 4-8.
25. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2) (2012) (authorizing reinstatement, double back pay, interest
on the back pay and special damages); 49 U.S.C. § 31105(b)(3)(C) (2012) (sanctioning punitive
damages up to $250,000).
26. Perez v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 353, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(pertaining to motion for summary judgment).
27. Id. at 357–58.
28. Id. at 358.
29. Id. at 359.
30. Id. at 359.
31. Id. at 359–60.
32. Id. at 359.
33. See Nate Raymond, Progenics Pharmaceuticals Must Pay $1.66 Million for Firing
Whistleblower¾Jury, REUTERS LEGAL, WESTLAW, Aug. 3, 2015. See generally Perez v. Progenics
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 3d 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (pertaining to post-jury trial motions).
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Protected Activity

The first stage of the analysis is to determine whether the
whistleblower engaged in protected activity. The whistleblower may have
revealed information about wrongdoing, but the wrongdoing must fall
within a statutory scheme.34 If the whistleblower, for example, notifies
authorities that her boss is parking in a no-parking zone, she may be
revealing wrongdoing, but there may not be a statute that offers
protection for such whistleblowing. Similarly, statutes typically require
that the whistleblower attempt to notify a responsible party or
government enforcement agency; contacting only the media about
wrongdoing, for example, would not constitute protected activity.35
Most whistleblowing regimes simply require that a whistleblower
reasonably believes that there is a substantive violation occurring.36 For
Dr. Perez, the relevant statute was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which states
that publicly traded companies may not:
[D]ischarge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner
discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of
employment because of any lawful act done by the employee . . . to provide
information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an
investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably
believes constitutes a violation of [the fraud provisions of Title 18], any rule
or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision
of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders, when the information
or assistance is provided to . . . a person with supervisory authority over the
employee (or such other person working for the employer who has the
authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct).37

The court proceeded to determine whether Dr. Perez reasonably
believed that he had uncovered evidence of securities fraud. It considered
Dr. Perez’s Ph.D. in chemistry, his four years of work on Relistor at
Progenics, and his lack of specific training in securities law. The court
concluded that a reasonable jury could find Dr. Perez’s belief to be
objectively reasonable.38
34. Richard Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 COLO. L. REV. 975, 977 (2008)
(describing disjointed, patchwork statutory approach to whistleblower protection).
35. See, e.g., Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to the
Media and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS. L.J.
151 (1994).
36. See 31 U.S.C. § 5328(d)(2) (2012) (“The protections of this section shall not apply to any
employee who . . . (2) knowingly or recklessly provides substantially false information to the Secretary,
the Attorney General, or any Federal supervisory agency.”); see also Mattson
v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying the “not utterly baseless” standard,
which seems to correspond to reasonable, good faith belief). But see Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969) (even malicious materials in a charge entitled plaintiff to
antiretaliation protection).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 15141 (2012).
38. Perez, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 365.
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2. Adverse Employment Action
Retaliation consists of undesirable action taken against the
whistleblower in response to the whistleblowing, but not all retaliation is
judicially cognizable. This Article focuses on adverse employment
actions, as Congress and courts have been willing to extend legal
protection to this subset of retaliatory behavior, typically stemming from
employers or former employers.39 Such actions include firing, demotion,
and marginalization in the employment context.40 The second stage of
the analysis is to determine whether the employee suffered an adverse
employment action. For Dr. Perez, this analysis is trivial, as Progenics
fired Dr. Perez.41
Although retaliation claims typically involve actions by the
employer, they may also involve actions by friends, family, and society at
large. Employer retaliation may come from management or coworkers,
and coworker retaliation may not necessarily be sanctioned by
management.42 Former employers and potential employers may also
retaliate against whistleblowers.43 For example, former employers might
speak ill of a former employee, give negative references, or even accuse
the former employee of wrongdoing. Similarly, potential employers
might not hire a whistleblower because of her prior whistleblowing
behavior.
Retaliation may be threatened or actually performed. In a survey of
military employees conducted by Michael T. Rehg et al., a wide variety of
retaliatory behavior¾ranging from loss of socialization, withdrawal of
support to perform work functions to firing¾was found.44 The most
frequently reported threatened retaliation was verbal harassment or
intimidation, but the most frequently reported actual retaliation was
poor performance appraisals.45
Courts often employ a reasonable person standard in evaluating the
harm faced by the whistleblower: would a reasonable person have been
39. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2012) (providing relief to “[a]ny employee, contractor, or agent”
who faced retaliatory action because of their whistleblowing under the False Claims Act);
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(B)(i) (2012) (supplying those retaliated against for whistleblowing a right of action);
see also Moore v. Cal. Inst. of Tech. Jet Propulsion Lab, 275 F.3d 838, 847–48 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“[B]ehavior does not constitute retaliation under the False Claims Act or Major Fraud Act unless it
would be sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII.”).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67
(2006) (interpreting the antiretaliation provision of Title VII).
41. Perez, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 359–60.
42. See Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, supra note 1, at 281.
43. See MARCIA P. MICELI ET AL., WHISTLE-BLOWING IN ORGANIZATIONS 11 (2008).
44. Michael T. Rehg et al., Antecedents and Outcomes of Retaliation Against Whistleblowers:
Gender Differences and Power Relationships, 19 ORG. SCI. 221, 230 (2008).
45. Id.
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dissuaded from blowing the whistle if she knew she would face such
retaliatory behavior?46 Courts have relied upon legislative intent in
determining the breadth of behavior that qualifies as an adverse
employment action.47 The underlying rationale for such analysis is likely
twofold. First, courts do not want to get involved in trivial, de minimis
behavior in a workplace, perhaps because they believe their time is better
spent elsewhere.48 Second, courts may be concerned that relief in such
circumstances would be difficult and impractical. Courts might find it
difficult to craft a monetary award for loss of social opportunities at the
lunch hour, and injunctive relief might be difficult to oversee.
3. Causality
Courts have established causality as the third element of an
antiretaliation claim: the protected activity must be the cause of the
adverse employment action.49 The core idea is that an employer who was
already going to fire an employee for an acceptable reason, such as poor
performance, should not be punished for retaliation because the
protected activity was unrelated to the adverse employment action. In the
case of Dr. Perez, Progenics argued that they fired Dr. Perez because Dr.
Perez was a thief who had accessed a confidential executive
memorandum.50 Therefore, according to Progenics, Dr. Perez’s
subsequent behavior in complaining about potential securities fraud had
no influence on the decision to fire him; the company claimed it would
have fired such a thief regardless of subsequent whistleblowing.51

46. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 57 (“[T]he employer’s actions must be
harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from [whistleblowing].”);
Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031, 2041–42 (2015)
(discussing the potential impact that time without pay would have on a reasonable person regarding
wiliness to file complaints against their employers).
47. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 543 (6th Cir. 1993)
(citing Congress’s “very clear intent” to conclude that Title VII forbids discrimination against a party
due to protected activity conducted by that party’s friends or relatives); White v. Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 799 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a literal interpretation of “discriminate
against” under Title VII was inappropriate because the Sixth Circuit thought it was “unlikely that
Congress intended to authorize Title VII claims over trivial matters”).
48. See, e.g., White, 364 F.3d at 799 (noting that the Sixth Circuit incorporated analysis of
Congressional purpose into its definition of adverse employment actions in order “to prevent lawsuits
based upon trivialities”); Kent v. Iowa, 651 F. Supp. 2d 910, 939 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (“The adverseemployment-action element is a warranted judicial interpretation of Title VII intended to deter
discrimination lawsuits based on trivial employment actions, such as those that cause a ‘mere
inconvenience’ or a ‘bruised ego.’”).
49. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524–25 (2013) (discussing
causation as a “standard requirement of any tort claim” in the Title VII retaliation context).
50. See Perez v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 353, 368–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
51. See id.
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The parallel argument to causality is that courts do not wish to
“reward” a bad employee. An employee who is a poor performer and
would have been fired on those grounds is a detriment to the employer,
and the employer suffers a loss by employing this person. Because the
employee is blameworthy for her poor performance, courts might feel
that it is inappropriate for that employee to benefit personally by blowing
the whistle.
This analysis is difficult, though, as courts must evaluate the various
motives of the employees whose behavior contributed to the adverse
employment action.52
Sometimes causality overlaps substantially with the protected
activity analysis. For example, a company might terminate an employee
specifically because she threatened to blow the whistle on corporate
behavior that was actually legal.53 Thus, the company argues that the
whistleblower acted in bad faith and should not be entitled to protection.
Alternatively, a company might terminate an employee because of her
participation, knowledge, or involvement with the illegal activity that she
reported to authorities.54 The company would argue that the employee
was morally culpable for the illegal behavior and that she should not be
rewarded with legal protection.
B. STATUTORY EMPHASIS ON PUBLIC CIVIL ENFORCEMENT
Despite the fact that these whistleblower statutes were passed by
different sessions of Congress over the past century, they share a
surprising commonality: an emphasis on public enforcement. While a
private harm view of retaliation would suggest much discussion
regarding a private right of action against her employer, the statutes
instead focus on public enforcement through civil litigation. Most of the
federal statutes do not explicitly discuss a private right of action. This
52. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 23, at Part V.A. 3-5 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Bd.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (mixed-motive analysis); Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981) (pretext analysis); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (pretext
analysis)); cf. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 23, at 3-7 V.B (citing Marano v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d
1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
53. See Julie Bort, Oracle Says It Will Sue a Fired Employee Who Filed a ‘Whistleblower’
Lawsuit, BUS. INSIDER (June 2, 2016, 11:51 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/oracle-says-will
-sue-fired-whistleblower-employee-2016-6.
54. Whistleblowers reporting money laundering are ineligible for retaliation protection if they
participated in the offense. See 31 U.S.C. § 5328(d)(1) (2012) (“The protections of this section shall not
apply to any employee who¾(1) deliberately causes or participates in the alleged violation of law or
regulation . . . .”). Otherwise, this becomes a mixed causation question: can you fire someone for
revealing their own bad behavior during the substantive claim? See, e.g., Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co.,
120 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 1997) (pertaining to retaliation against an employee for participating in
another employee’s Title VII lawsuit against their employer).
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Article suggests this is strong evidence that Congress recognizes the
public importance of combating whistleblower retaliation.
The statutes take different approaches in describing the role of
public enforcement. The most common system is to require government
investigation of alleged retaliation. One statute, ISCA, authorizes
government action but makes such action optional. Other statutes
require government investigation and also require litigation against
defendants.
1.

An Optional Government Role

The ISCA prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers who report
unsafe shipping containers.55 The statute indicates that “the Secretary [of
Labor] may investigate” a complaint of retaliation and “may bring a civil
action” if there has been a violation.56 The statute does not appear to
require any government enforcement but it clearly authorizes public
investigation and litigation.
2.

Government Required to Investigate

The most common approach is to require government investigation
of alleged retaliation. The Clean Air Act of 1977 (“CAA”) provides
protection for whistleblowers against discharge or discrimination.57 Once
an employee lodges a complaint of retaliation, the statute states that “the
Secretary shall conduct an investigation” and “[w]ithin thirty days of the
receipt of such complaint, the Secretary shall complete such
investigation.”58 The statute notes that if a violation is deemed to have
occurred, “the Secretary shall order the person who committed the
violation to take affirmative action to abate the violation, and reinstate
the complainant to his former position together with the compensation
(including back pay), terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”59
This requires the government to take some action, namely issue an order,
if there has been an adverse employment action. Later in the statute,
however, the government’s responsibilities are reduced: “Whenever a
person has failed to comply with an order issued under subsection (b)(2)
of this section, the Secretary may file a civil action in the United States
district court for the district in which the violation was found to occur to
enforce such order.”60 Curiously, the government is not actually required
to file a civil action to compel compliance with the remedial order. Thus,
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

46 U.S.C. § 80507(a) (2012).
§ 80507(c).
42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2012).
§ 7622(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
§ 7622(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
§ 7622(d) (emphasis added).
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while the government does bear the risk of having to issue an order, it
does not explicitly bear any risk of litigation in dealing with the adverse
employment action. The CAA’s language is shared by the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act (“STAA”)61 and the Wendell H. Ford
Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (“AIR21”).62
Other statutes require investigation “as appropriate” or under
certain conditions. For example, the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1976
(“SWDA”) regulates the recovery of energy and other resources from
discarded materials and the management of hazardous waste.63 The
statute prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers and other employees
participating under the act.64 If retaliation is alleged, the statute indicates
“the Secretary of Labor shall cause such investigation to be made as he
deems appropriate.”65 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act66 and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act67 contain similar “as appropriate” language.
Another example is the Energy Reorganization Act of 1978 (“ERA”),
which simply requires the government to investigate and provide a
written report of the results within thirty days.68 Regardless of the results
of the investigation, there is no further requirement for the government
to litigate on behalf of the whistleblower.69 The ERA has a kick-out
provision, allowing a whistleblower to file an action for relief if there has
been no decision after one year.70
3.

Government Required to Investigate and Litigate

A few statutes, such as the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”),
require both investigation and civil action.
Upon receiving the complaint, the Secretary shall conduct an
investigation of the violation alleged in the complaint.71 The investigation
will be completed within thirty days and the Secretary shall provide
written notice of the results.72 Notice and opportunity for agency hearing

61. 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (2012).
62. 49 U.S.C. § 42121.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 6971(a).
65. § 6971(b).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (emphasis added).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9610.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(A).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(d) (providing Secretary the option, but not a mandate, to file a civil action
on behalf of the whistleblower).
70. § 5851(b)(4).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(2)(A)(1).
72. Id.
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are provided before the Secretary makes an order on the record.73
Whenever a person has failed to comply with an order issued, the
Secretary shall file a civil action in U.S. district court.74
The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 (“SDWA”),75 the Asbestos
Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986 (“AHERA”),76 and the OSHA77
similarly require both investigation and civil litigation.
C. LIMITED DISCUSSION OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
In contrast to the common specifics regarding public enforcement,
most of the statutes do not discuss private enforcement. In the instances
private enforcement is mentioned, Congress generally views private
enforcement as a backstop to government failure.
One backstop is the “kick out” provision. The STAA, the ERA, and
Sarbanes-Oxley (“SOX”)78 specify a private right of action if the
government fails to act.79 The ERA, for example, requires the government
to investigate and provide a written report regarding alleged retaliation
within thirty days.80 If the government fails to take action after one year,
the statute states that a whistleblower may file an action for relief.81
Another type of backstop addresses the failure of government
litigation as distinct from government investigation. Three statutes, the
CAA,82 the AIR2183, and the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act,84 specify
a private right of action if the government has ordered the defendant to
take corrective action for retaliation. Under these statutes, the
government must have found illegal retaliation and ordered the
defendant to correct its behavior. Congress’s introduction of this limited
private right of action suggests concern that the government might fail to
follow up the order with litigation. Under these few statutes, the
whistleblower can litigate compliance with the order herself.

73. § 2622(b)(2)(A).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 2622(d) (emphasis added).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 2651.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 660 (c).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (allowing private civil action if the Secretary of Labor has not issued
a final decision within 180 days).
79. While a whistleblower reporting a securities violation under SOX must allow OSHA to first
investigate a claim of retaliation, such a whistleblower may also have independent rights under DoddFrank to pursue a civil retaliation case against her employer regardless of OSHA participation. See 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B) (2012); see also Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir.
2013) (discussing narrower whistleblower rights under Dodd-Frank).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(A).
81. § 5851(b)(4).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7622(e).
83. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(6).
84. 49 U.S.C. § 60129(b)(6).
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One whistleblower statute that has resulted in pure private
enforcement is the False Claims Act (“FCA”). The FCA generally forbids
fraud against the federal government. Besides offering a reward for
whistleblowers, the FCA also indicates that whistleblowers are entitled to
relief in face of retaliation. It uses the passive voice to indicate that an
action “may be brought” for such relief in federal district court.85 The
statute makes no specific reference to the role of the government in
addressing retaliation. In practice, it is the whistleblower’s responsibility
to obtain relief for employer retaliation in court.86
Despite the limited discussion in these federal statutes of private
enforcement for retaliation, it is important to note that some courts have
recognized a common law cause of action for whistleblowing retaliation
in general.87 While varying among the states, courts have established a
public policy exception to employment-at-will, and some states extend
the public policy exception to cover whistleblowing.
D. WHY DID CONGRESS VARY IN ITS REQUESTS FOR PUBLIC
ENFORCEMENT?
While these disparate whistleblower retaliation statutes are similar
in the focus on public enforcement, it is less clear is why Congress
decided on such variation. Why should the government be required to
litigate a case of retaliation against an employee who reveals violations of
the Safe Drinking Water Act, but not be required to litigate against
retaliation if she reveals violations of the Clean Air Act or the Solid Waste
Disposal Act? The explanation might be the statutes’ chronology: the four
statutes mandating agency litigation are from the 1970s and 1980s. The
statutes requiring only agency investigation extend over a greater time
period, with AIR21 dating to 200088 and SWDA from 1976.89 A
chronological explanation, however, does not provide much insight into
legislative intent.
One particularly cynical view might be that Congress did not really
care about public or private enforcement. Instead, Congress’s priority
was to signal to potential whistleblowers that Congress was concerned

85. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2) (2012).
86. See CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT loc.
§ 5:1 (2016) (ebook).
87. See STEPHEN P. P EPE & SCOTT H. DUNHAM, AVOIDING & DEFENDING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
CLAIMS loc. § 1:7 (updated July 2015) (ebook).
88. Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR21),
49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2000).
89. Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (1996).
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about stopping retaliation.90 Even if public or private enforcement were
ineffective, the objective was to make sure that whistleblowers came
forward with information. Once the whistleblower revealed her
information and faced retaliation, Congress might not care if she actually
faced retaliation or received compensation. In the long run, though, such
a strategy is likely futile, as whistleblowers would learn of the
ineffectiveness of antiretaliation efforts.
Even if there is any merit to this cynical symbolic view, it would be
more helpful to consider the potential benefits of actual litigation. We
may be able to draw some inferences into legislative intent by beginning
with the instrumental differences between public and private
enforcement. There is a substantial literature discussing the relative
merits of public versus private enforcement.91 Private civil litigation
regarding employer retaliation has a number of advantages. The
whistleblower may have a comparatively superior ability to identify
retaliation, as she is already present in the workplace.92 Similarly,
whistleblowers may also provide greater and further resources towards
litigation in comparison to constrained government budgets.93 Public
enforcement agencies may fail to enforce laws due to political
pressures.94 Therefore, a decision by Congress to require government
investigation but not litigation in CAA, for example, might imply that
Congress believes private resources are particularly important to
litigating retaliation against whistleblowers who identify CAA violations.
Public enforcement nonetheless has its comparative advantages.
The downside to private civil litigation is the lack of public accountability
and control over the volume and intensity of litigation.95 This may

90. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 233
(1990) (describing “symbolic” legislation that is difficult to implement but obtains political benefits
for legislators); Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of
the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413, 446 (1999) (describing Congress’s efforts to
balance “the perceived political benefit of being viewed as doing something versus the real and
disastrous consequences of actually doing something”).
91. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974) (discussing the creation of rules created to
increase the effectiveness of law enforcement); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private
Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975) (adding to previous article with new theories); A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980))
(analyzing the decision process in imposing monetary sanctions to certain offenses); Steven Shavell,
The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J. L. ECON. 255 (1993).
92. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 108 (2005) (turning to the role of
the executive branch in enforcing federal law in private actions).
93. See id. at 108–09.
94. See id. at 110.
95. See id. at 114–20.
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manifest in under-enforcement.96 Private parties may not sufficiently
invest in combating retaliation, perhaps because either the litigants or
the attorneys do not find the financial rewards for doing so to be
sufficient. This may also manifest in over-enforcement: too many people
with weak retaliation claims may bring cases forward.
Working from this theoretical background of the comparative
advantages of public and private enforcement, Congressional
requirement of agency enforcement of antiretaliation provisions could
signal a variety of positions. One possibility is that Congress does not
trust agencies to exercise discretion in case selection and therefore
mandates agency enforcement of antiretaliation provisions. It is possible
that Congress did not trust the Secretary of Labor to properly prioritize
investigation and litigation on behalf of whistleblowers alleging
retaliation under the Toxic Substances Control Act or the Safe Drinking
Water Act, for example, and thus included a mandate to investigate and
litigate allegations of whistleblower retaliation.
On a related line of reasoning, it is also possible that Congress
expressly mandated agency action against whistleblower retaliation for
specific statutes because it believed whistleblowers under those statutes,
such as TSCA or OSHA, required the greatest protection from retaliation.
Implicitly, Congress believed that public enforcement was the most
effective method of prosecuting and deterring retaliation. This claim also
implies that whistleblowers under other statutes like the Clean Air Act,
do not require similarly great levels of protection from retaliation.
Another version of this argument is that Congress did not trust
private enforcement of these whistleblower retaliation claims. By
mandating agency investigation and litigation while providing no express
private right of action, Congress might believe that OSHA
whistleblowers, for example, would be particularly likely to bring
questionable retaliation claims against their employers.
Substantively, though, it is difficult to understand why
whistleblowers under TSCA, SDWA.97 the Asbestos Hazard Emergency
Response Act of 1986 (“AHERA”),98 and the OSHA99 stand apart from
the other statutes such as the Clean Air Act and the Solid Waste Disposal
Act, the Energy Reorganization Act, and the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act.
96. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 91, at 10–16 (comparing public and private
enforcement); Shavell, supra note 91, at 256 (discussing possibility that private benefits to litigants do
not align with societal benefits).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (2011).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 2651 (2012).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2012).
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In contrast, it is also possible that congressional inclusion of the
private rights of action more strongly signals either the importance of
combating retaliation or the distrust of agency enforcement. A number
of statutes include the kick-out provisions expressly providing for private
rights of action when the responsible agency fails to take appropriate
action. Importantly, none of the statutes mandating agency investigation
and litigation incorporate such a kick-out provision. The express
declaration of the private right of action might signal some distrust over
the reliability of public enforcement. It may also signal the comparatively
high importance of addressing retaliation against whistleblowers under
the Energy Reorganization Act or SOX, for example.
E. A PUBLIC VIEW OF RETALIATION
Whatever Congress’s specific views as to the advantages of private
versus public enforcement, this Article suggests that the legislative focus
on public enforcement is strong evidence that Congress recognizes the
public importance of combating whistleblower retaliation.
Whistleblower retaliation cases are not solely about a private
whistleblower litigating against retaliation as her private interest. Even
though remedies focus on back pay, reinstatement, and other
compensatory elements that appear private in nature, this Article argues
Congress also embraces a public view of retaliation that extends beyond
a whistleblower receiving compensation for retaliation.
The common congressional mandate for agency investigation
suggests that the agency, and thus the public, has an interest in learning
the truth about retaliation complaints: did an employer wrongfully
retaliate against the whistleblower?
This interest in learning the truth is partially divergent from the
other parties’ private interests. The other parties to the conflict are the
defendant-employer and the whistleblower. The whistleblower’s private
interest is compensation¾she may be happy to receive a settlement that
leaves unresolved the question of actual retaliation.100 Similarly, the
employer may also be reluctant to invest heavily in ascertaining the truth
of the retaliation. Even though the investment may help vindicate the
employer should the case go to trial, the employer may rationally decide
that the stakes are too low to be worth the investigation costs.101 A
100. See, e.g., Jocelyn Patricia Bond, Efficiency Considerations and the Use of Taxpayer
Resources: An Analysis of Proposed Whistleblower Protection Act Revisions, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 107,
137 (2009) (whistleblower plaintiffs may have an incentive to settle in order to avoid the additional
expense of jury trials).
101. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. MARY L. REV. 65, 97 (2007) (“[A] settlement may
simply reflect an employer’s increased willingness to enter ‘nuisance-value’ settlements rather than
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settlement without admitting liability may be in both the whistleblower’s
and the employer’s interests.
The public interest in learning the truth about retaliation is
important for numerous reasons. The public interest incorporates a
whistleblower properly receiving compensation for retaliation, and the
truth is important to that process. If a whistleblower did face retaliation
for revealing wrongdoing, it is in the public interest that the
whistleblower receive some compensation for her loss. Without such
compensation, future whistleblowers might be deterred from coming
forward with important information. Similarly, the public interest also
incorporates the defendant’s interest in not facing frivolous allegations
of retaliation.
More importantly to the public, though, is the interest in deterring
others from retaliating against whistleblowers. Learning the truth about
actual retaliation is a vital step in determining the scope of the problem:
how and when do employers retaliate against whistleblowers? If the
public does not know the truth regarding retaliation, how can potential
whistleblowers be assured that it is safe to come forward? If the
government can provide assurances that retaliation will be accurately
detected and that violators will be punished, it hopefully can deter
employers from retaliating against whistleblowers. The government has
tremendous ability to deter retaliation. Its powers are not limited to
solely litigating for back wages on behalf of the whistleblower. For
example, the government can threaten punitive measures for retaliation.
The government can refer the corporation and individuals within for
criminal sanctions such as obstruction of justice,102 witness tampering,103
or conspiracy charges.104 The government also has broad investigatory
powers, allowing investigation of other facets of the employer’s business.
If retaliation does not occur, the costs of investigation and litigation
should be reduced for all parties.
Stated another way, before a sincere whistleblower blows the
whistle, her interests and the public’s interests overlap greatly. She
wishes to the blow the whistle and alert the public to some wrongdoing
committed by her employer, and the public wants her to blow the whistle
on the wrongdoing. She also desires not to face retaliation for actions.

pay the high litigation costs of an ALJ hearing. Or employers may have settled . . . to avoid bad
publicity, even if the allegations were without merit.”).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2012).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). See McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp, 206 F.3d 1031, 1034 (11th
Cir. 2000) (retaliation against an employee testifying against employer “plainly describe criminal
conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and a criminal conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.”).
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She would incur personal loss if she faced retaliation, and personal loss
is a disincentive to blowing the whistle. The public wants the
whistleblower coming forward with information. Thus, the public also
does not want the whistleblower to face retaliation. The whistleblower
also would prefer to receive compensation for any losses she suffers due
to retaliation, but assuming such compensation is always incomplete or
imperfect, her top priority is to not face retaliation in the first place.
Again, the public has an interest in reassuring the whistleblower that she
will receive compensation. These are the ex ante interests shared by the
public and the whistleblower.
After any potential retaliation has occurred, however, the public’s
interest and the whistleblower’s interests are less compatible. The
government certainly wants to see the whistleblower receive
compensation if she suffered illegal retaliation. The government’s
interest, however, extends beyond this specific whistleblower retaliation
case. The government must also consider the impact this case has on
future potential whistleblowers. The government must still convince
future whistleblowers that the government is on their side: they will work
to deter employers from retaliating against whistleblowers and to
support whistleblowers who face retaliation. To achieve this goal, the
government must determine if the whistleblower actually faced illegal
retaliation.
In contrast, the whistleblower is in a different position after having
faced retaliation. Her best case scenario is no longer available: she
believes she has already endured an adverse employment action
triggered by her whistleblowing. She has thus suffered personal loss
already, and ongoing litigation and investigation may similarly be
immediately costly, even if additional litigation could potentially result
in greater future compensation. Settlement before full investigation and
litigation may be very attractive to her.
Civil retaliation claims, therefore, embrace both private and public
interests. The public interest is not merely an aggregation of private
interests; it is more than each whistleblower’s interest in obtaining
compensation. The public interest also incorporates a greater need to
determine the truth regarding each claim of retaliation, as this truth is
critical in fashioning an effective enforcement scheme. The public’s
greater interest is in preventing future retaliation and encouraging
potential whistleblowers to bring forward reliable information.
Congress’s general requirement that OSHA investigate claims of
retaliation supports this distinct public interest.
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II. THE PROBLEMATIC PRIVATE VIEW
Despite Congress’s emphasis of the public interest in combating
whistleblower retaliation, there are signs that OSHA and the judiciary
instead treat whistleblower retaliation as a private dispute. First, courts
have expressly described whistleblower retaliation actions as private in
nature and rejected arguments that would support the public interest in
such cases. Second, there is evidence that OSHA and the Secretary of
Labor limit their participation in retaliation cases. Finally, generally
unsuccessful trends of whistleblower retaliation claims suggest that the
overall system is unwell.
A. JUDICIAL LANGUAGE
Some courts have expressly described civil retaliation litigation as
private in nature.105 In holding a claim for retaliation as subject to
arbitration, the Second Circuit described the primary purpose of the
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provisions as “to provide a private remedy
for the aggrieved employee [and] not to publicize alleged corporate
misconduct.”106 As a private remedy, the retaliation claim was subject to
the arbitration provisions of the employee’s contract, and the Second
Circuit further affirmed the confidentiality clause of the employee’s
arbitration agreement.107 The court recognized that enforcing the
arbitration’s confidentiality clause would foreclose the employee of “the
same opportunity to expose publicly [her employer’s] alleged
wrongdoing,” but “the loss of a public forum in which to air allegations of
fraud does not undermine the statutory purpose of a whistleblower
protection provision.”108 Moreover, the court viewed an attack on
arbitration confidentiality as a generalized attack on arbitration because
confidentiality clauses are so common.109

105. See, e.g., California v. IntelliGender, LLC, 771 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing
agency action under Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection as “individual compensatory” relief and
not an attempt to “vindicate broader governmental interests.”) (citing Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc.,
346 F.3d 908, 923 (9th Cir. 2003) and Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2006)). But
see, e.g., Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 738 F. Supp. 279, 285 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (whistleblower
retaliation is “more than just a decision to fire an employee. It involves a decision to fire an employee
for his attempts to remedy alleged violations of federal law. . . . Clearly, the matter is one effecting a
major public concern.”).
106. Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 383 (2d Cir. 2008).
107. See id. at 385–86.
108. Id. at 384.
109. See id. at 385.
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The purpose of discussing this Second Circuit language is not to
address the merits or appropriateness of arbitration for these clauses,110
but rather to highlight the court’s express views as to the private nature
of whistleblower retaliation claims. Nor does this Article fault the Second
Circuit’s position as unreasonable; its belief that the whistleblower’s
claims are essentially private in nature may reasonably stem from
observing agency behavior. If OSHA has the right to bring an action but
chooses not to do so, a possible inference is that the particular retaliation
case is primary private in nature. Nonetheless, it is troubling that the
Second Circuit seems comfortable in allowing the defendant to conceal
potential wrongdoing through the confidentiality clause.
The Ninth Circuit has taken stronger direct action against public
enforcement under OSHA. In Leon v. IDX Systems Corp, the court held
OSHA to be in privity with a whistleblower private retaliation claim and
thus curtailed OSHA’s ability to separately pursue the public interest.111
Dr. Mauricio Leon worked for IDX and complained about corporate
mismanagement involving misuse of federal funds.112 In 2003, IDX put
Dr. Leon on unpaid leave and sought to terminate his employment.113 Dr.
Leon complained that he was facing retaliation for whistleblowing and
brought both a civil complaint under the False Claims Act in federal
district court and a complaint with OSHA under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.114 In 2004, the district court determined that Dr. Leon acted in bad
faith by destroying evidence; it sanctioned him by dismissing his case.115
The district court, however, declined to enjoin OSHA from proceeding
with its investigation of Dr. Leon’s SOX antiretaliation claim against
IDX: it declared that Dr. Leon and OSHA were not in privity because
“their interests differed¾[OSHA] represents a ‘broad public interest,’”
while Dr. Leon sought personal compensation.116 In 2005, OSHA issued
its findings and order, concluding that there was reasonable cause to
believe that IDX violated SOX by retaliating against Dr. Leon.117 OSHA
ordered IDX to pay Dr. Leon back wages and reasonable attorneys’
fees.118 It also ordered IDX to post a public notice to its employees that
incorporated an agreement to refrain from future retaliation, and to

110. For a discussion on the merits of arbitration, see, for example, Peter B. Rutledge
& Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2013).
111. Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2006).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 957. In addition to dismissal, the court also applied monetary sanctions against Dr. Leon.
116. Id. at 962.
117. Id. at 957.
118. Id.
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refrain from future retaliation against Dr. Leon or any other
whistleblower covered by SOX.119
The Ninth Circuit overturned the district court’s decision, holding
OSHA’s power under SOX to be limited to private compensation and thus
not part of the broader public interest.120 OSHA was therefore in privity
with Dr. Leon and the requirements of res judicata were satisfied, which
paved the way for the district court to enjoin OSHA from taking action
against IDX.121
The Leon decision is more troubling because it allows district courts
to stop OSHA analysis of retaliation claims before the agency has
completed its investigation of the whistleblower’s claims. It is possible
that Dr. Leon’s egregious spoliation triggered the Ninth Circuit’s
hostility, but OSHA also seemed to consider the spoliation in its decision
finding in favor of Dr. Leon.122
B. OSHA’S LOW PRIORITY OF ANTIRETALIATION
Delegation of all retaliation enforcement cases to OSHA makes
sense in one regard: as a single agency, OSHA can develop expertise in
analyzing allegations of adverse employment actions. This type of
analysis is likely not part of the expertise of the agency handling the
substantive law.
Unfortunately, OSHA is an agency primarily dedicated to workplace
health and safety; antiretaliation has been described as a “bureaucratic
stepchild” at the agency.123 The Government Accountability Office has
criticized OSHA for using timeliness as the only performance measure
for its antiretaliation efforts.124 The Department of Labor’s Office of
Inspector General has criticized OSHA for various failures after
examining 1200 antiretaliation cases from 2009–10.125 In a report, the
OIG found that eighty percent of the investigations failed to comply with
119. Id.
120. Id. at 962–63. The court recognized that OSHA’s order contemplated broad injunctive relief
that did not only serve Dr. Leon’s interest, but it was suspicious of OSHA’s power to make such an
order, and it also noted OSHA’s failure to participate in appellate argument. See id. at 962 n.9.
121. Id. at 962–63.
122. Id. at 957.
123. DEVINE & VISWESVARAN, supra note 3, at 168.
124. DEVINE & VISWESVARAN, supra note 3, at 176 n.77–78.
125. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, COMPLAINANTS DID NOT ALWAYS RECEIVE APPROPRIATE
INVESTIGATIONS UNDER THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAM (2010), http://www.oig.dol.gov/
public/reports/oa/2010/02-10-202-10-105.pdf [hereinafter 2010 OIG REPORT]. Improvements were
made and reported in a 2015 OIG report. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OSHA
NEEDS TO CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN ITS WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAMS (2015),
https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2015/02-15-202-10-105.pdf [hereinafter 2015 OIG
REPORT].
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OSHA’s own investigation procedures.126 Only two percent of cases were
found to be meritorious.127 Roughly half of its investigations were
conducted without any face-to-face interviews.128
Moreover, OSHA, for example, has sole authority to take action in
antiretaliation cases stemming under section 11(c): the statute requires
that OSHA investigate and litigate cases, and there is no private fallback
option specified.129 In fiscal year 2009, out of 1280 retaliation
complaints, OSHA investigators recommended litigation in 15 cases.130
The Office of the Solicitor, however, only selected four cases for litigation,
a 0.31% selection rate.131 Without third-party analysis of the merits of
these retaliation cases, it is difficult to determine whether the lack of
public enforcement was justified in these cases. Nonetheless, the low
litigation enforcement rate may suggest that OSHA is not heavily
invested in public litigation of whistleblower retaliation cases.
Additionally, OSHA’s own retaliation investigation process
emphasizes the private nature of the complaint. For example, of the eight
sample factors under the egregious conduct standard,132 only one factor
(h) references the substantive offense: “extensive or serious violations of
the substantive statute.”133 In the calculations for punitive damages, the
substantive conduct is not directly mentioned except in a single reference

126. See 2010 OIG REPORT, supra note 125, at 2.
127. See 2010 OIG REPORT, supra note 125, at 21.
128. 2010 OIG REPORT, supra note 125, at 5.
129. See 29 U.S.C. § 660.
130. DEVINE & VISWESVARAN, supra note 3, at 166.
131. DEVINE & VISWESVARAN, supra note 3, at 166.
132. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 23, at 6-9 to 6-10.
Examples of egregious conduct include, but are not limited to:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

f.
g.

h.

A discharge accompanied by previous or simultaneous harassment or subsequent
blacklisting.
A complainant has been discharged because of his or her association with a
whistleblower.
A group of whistleblowers has been discharged.
There has been a pattern or practice of retaliation in violation of the statutes that
OSHA administers and the case fits the pattern.
There is a policy contrary to rights protected by the statute (for example, a policy
requiring safety complaints to be made to management before filing them with OSHA
or restricting employee discussions with OSHA compliance officers during
inspections) and the retaliation relates to this policy.
A manager commits violence against the complainant.
The adverse action is accompanied by public humiliation, threats of violence or other
retribution against the complainant, or by violence, other retribution, or threats
thereof against the complainant’s family, co-workers, or friends.
The retaliation is accompanied by extensive or serious violations of the substantive
statute, e.g., serious violations of OSHA standards in a Section 11(c) case or serious
violations of commercial motor carrier safety regulations in a STAA case.

133. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 23, at 6-9.
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to the egregious conduct standards.134 Violation of the substantive statute
would drive the public interest in protecting the whistleblower. The rest
of the factors emphasize the private nature of the retaliation. Failing to
consider the import of the substantive violation can easily lead to the
private view of the retaliation case.
C. TROUBLING ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS
The existing statistics from whistleblower retaliation cases may also
signal trouble with the primarily private enforcement retaliation scheme.
General statistics covering whistleblower retaliation cases demonstrate
very low rates of formal victories, ranging from 0.31% to 9.8%.135 As
OSHA’s own statistics note, whistleblowers alleging retaliation under a
variety of statutes generally do not fare well.136 In FY 2015, retaliation
claims had roughly a twenty-five percent aggregate “positive outcome”
rate.137 Older statistics similarly confirm these trends.138 Any
whistleblower viewing such statistics is likely to be discouraged, as her
chances of successfully prevailing in litigation appear low. The challenge
with such statistics, however, is that they do not give insight into the
134. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 23, at 6-10.
A number of factors should be considered in calculating a punitive damages award, including:
a.
b.
c.
d.

e.
f.
g.

h.
i.

j.

Degree of the respondent’s awareness that its conduct was illegal (see discussion
above).
Egregiousness of the conduct (many of the factors are discussed above).
Duration and frequency of the adverse action.
Respondent’s response to the complaint and investigation: for example, whether the
respondent admitted wrongdoing, cooperated in the investigation, offered remedies
to the complainant on its own, or disciplined managers who were at fault. On the other
hand, it is appropriate to consider whether the respondent was uncooperative during
the investigation, covered up retaliation, falsified evidence, or misled the investigator.
Financial condition of the respondent.
Evidence that the respondent attempted to conceal or provide pretextual reasons for
the adverse action.
Evidence that the respondent tolerated or created a workplace culture that
discouraged or punished whistleblowing; in other words, whistleblowers were chilled
from engaging in protected activity.
Deliberate nature of the retaliation or actual threats to the complainant for his/her
complaints to management.
Whether OSHA has found merit in whistleblower complaints in past cases against the
same respondent involving the same type of conduct at issue in the complaint, so as
to suggest a pattern of retaliatory conduct.
Other mitigating or aggravating factors.

135. DEVINE & VISWESVARAN, supra note 3, at 165–66.
136. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 3.
137. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 3. Positive outcome indicates a merits
determination in favor of the whistleblower or any settlement.
138. See Eugene R. Fidell, Federal Protection of Private Sector Health and Safety Whistleblowers,
2 ADMIN L.J. 1, 9–10 (1988).
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underlying merits of the cases. For example, if every whistleblower files
an antiretaliation case, but in reality, very few whistleblowers actually
face retaliation, we might expect to see such low success rates. In
contrast, if most whistleblowers do face retaliation, but success rates are
so low, the process is probably defective. The big question is whether
these retaliation case outcomes properly reflect merit: is it true that very
few whistleblower retaliation claims are meritorious? Even the Office of
Inspector General has not conducted any systematic, third-party
evaluation of the merits of these cases. Note that OSHA itself has been
criticized for failing to evaluate the merits of its retaliation cases; a critical
report suggests that OSHA’s internal evaluation system focuses solely on
timeliness of evaluation.139
First, regardless of whether the present antiretaliation litigation
outcomes properly reflect merit, this Article suggests that the existence
of such low success rates likely informs potential whistleblowers. While
these statistics can arguably be interpreted as evidence of a successful
system (if it is true that most retaliation claims are actually meritless),
potential whistleblowers are likely to draw negative inferences regarding
any potential retaliation claim. Knowledge of the poor success rates could
dissuade potential whistleblowers from blowing the whistle in fear of
retaliation. Additionally, knowledge of these poor success rates may
embolden employers considering retaliation against whistleblowers. An
even worse scenario is that these statistics are driving a vicious feedback
loop: because potential whistleblowers see the weak statistics regarding
successful retaliation litigation, only the whistleblowers with weak
retaliation cases come forward in the first place. Potential whistleblowers
who are good employees and should prevail in an antiretaliation case are
unwilling to come forward because they have the most to lose. If good
employees have better information or are otherwise more desirable as
whistleblowers, this system may discourage them from coming forward.
Second, there is evidence that these weak antiretaliation litigation
outcomes are due in large part to non-merit based arguments. Richard
Moberly examines whistleblowers claiming retaliation under
Sarbanes-Oxley, noting that employees had a win rate of 3.6%.140 He
conducts a more detailed examination of these cases, though. While he
does not directly evaluate the merits of the cases, he does evaluate the
standards by which retaliation cases were turned down. He sets aside
settlements, which constitute between 11.6% and 18.3% of the cases, as
he lacks data to directly measure the merits of those settlements.141
139. 2015 OIG REPORT, supra note 125, at 5; see also 2010 OIG REPORT, supra note 125.
140. Moberly, supra note 101, at 67.
141. Moberly, supra note 101, at 96–98.
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Looking at retaliation cases in which the employer wins (the majority of
cases),142 he evaluates the rationale employed by OSHA or the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).143 He finds that most antiretaliation
claims are based on procedural or boundary grounds as opposed to the
merits.144 The most common procedural denial is a statute of limitations
problem; OSHA and the ALJ appear reluctant to utilize equitable tolling
to alleviate the 90-day time limit for filing a retaliation claim under
SOX.145 Common boundary grounds for denial include whether an
employer is actually covered by SOX and whether the allegations of
wrongdoing fit within the SOX regime.146 For example, while SOX clearly
covers publicly traded companies, it is unclear that SOX covers a
privately held subsidiary of a publicly traded company and if the
subsidiary’s employees constitute “agents” of the publicly traded
company.147 As an example of whether wrongdoing fits within the SOX
regime, some ALJs found that a whistleblower reporting accounting
errors did not constitute protected whistleblowing behavior if she were
unable to tie those errors to someone’s scheme of intentional fraud on
shareholders.148
Worse yet, this trend appears to be increasing. At the OSHA level,
denials are increasingly based on boundary reasons.149 This evidence
suggests that whistleblowers are either not engaging attorneys to
represent them or that the attorneys representing them are failing their
clients. It is possible that the ninety-day limit under SOX is unreasonable
given the constraints of investigation and legal practice. The rate at which
procedural issues are increasing further suggests that either
whistleblowers are not learning of the need for attorneys over time or that
those attorneys representing them are not learning to do better.
III. REAFFIRMING THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN RETALIATION
Separating the problems of the private view of retaliation from the
problem of limited resources for public enforcement is difficult. One
possibility is that OSHA or the Secretary of Labor embracing the private
view is the cause of limited resources being applied towards public

142. Moberly, supra note 101, at 96. Employees win in only 2.6% of the cases. At the ALJ level,
employee withdrawal is the plurality outcome at forty percent of cases.
143. Moberly, supra note 101, at 102 tbl.4.
144. Moberly, supra note 101, at 102 100-04.
145. Moberly, supra note 101, at 102 tbl.4; Moberly, supra note 101, at 107–09.
146. Moberly, supra note 101, at 102 tbl.4.
147. Moberly, supra note 101, at 110–11.
148. Moberly, supra note 101, at 117–18.
149. Moberly, supra note 101, at 129.
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enforcement. Why allocate public resources towards the litigation of
private interests? It is also possible, though, that limited resources are
encouraging the private review of retaliation. If OSHA is perpetually
underfunded, its failure to publicly litigate retaliation cases may
reinforce the perception that retaliation is a private matter. The strongest
affirmation of public interest is public litigation. The most direct solution
would therefore be the addition of greater enforcement resources. Given
the history of OSHA and the limited funding of these enforcement efforts,
however, this Article will consider a different direction.
A. IMMEDIATE CHANGES FOR OSHA
By statute, OSHA has a general mandate to investigate most claims
of retaliation. As the public face of whistleblower antiretaliation efforts,
OSHA has an immediate opportunity to affirm the public importance of
combating whistleblower retaliation. This Article proposes two strategies
for the agency. First, OSHA should adjust the goals of its investigation to
signal the public interest in each whistleblower retaliation case. Second,
OSHA should increase application of punitive sanctions to further
demonstrate the public importance of combating retaliation.
1.

OSHA to Prioritize Identification of Frivolous Claims in
Investigation

Given resource constraints on OSHA, this Article suggests that the
broad goal of investigation should be the classification of retaliation cases
into three categories: non-meritorious, possibly meritorious, and
meritorious. This differs from the current binary regime that
distinguishes meritorious from non-meritorious cases.150 The existing
regime makes sense if there are sufficient resources to obtain such
accurate results in a timely fashion.
With insufficient resources, however, and time constraints such as
those presented by Leon v. IDX, this Article suggests that OSHA’s first
priority in investigation should be the identification of non-meritorious
cases. Dismissing or otherwise disposing of non-meritorious cases is in
the public interest: society is not better off for having these cases
lingering.
This strategy allows OSHA to affirm that subsequent investment in
any not dismissed cases is in the public interest. OSHA may have
insufficient resources to thoroughly investigate every possibly
meritorious case, but it can at least affirm that additional investigation is
in the public interest. In Guyden v. Aetna, for example, OSHA might have

150. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 23.
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been unsure as to the merits of Guyden’s retaliation claim, but it had
serious allegations of retaliation in other cases to investigate.151 It is
possible that, had OSHA spent more effort investigating, it would have
uncovered stronger evidence of retaliation. OSHA could have used a
possibly meritorious designation to signal to courts that it was still
interested in learning the truth about the allegations in the case. Unlike
the existing binary signal of meritorious versus non-meritorious that
implies greater certainty about public interest, the option of a possibly
meritorious designation allows OSHA to communicate an ongoing public
interest even if it has insufficient resources to prioritize that particular
case.
This converts the non-meritorious finding into a unilateral right of
dismissal for OSHA. Such a right is similar to the substantive process
under the FCA: when a whistleblower brings an allegation of fraud under
the FCA, the complaint is immediately stayed and sealed.152 The DOJ and
the allegedly defrauded agency investigate the complaint and have three
choices: they may intervene and take over the case, they may decline
intervention, or they may unilaterally dismiss the case.153
This power is immediately useful because OSHA will already be
investigating the whistleblower’s claims. If OSHA comes to the
conclusion that the whistleblower’s behavior is frivolous, malicious, or
otherwise unjustifiable, it can reduce the subsequent burden on the
judiciary and the defendant by eliminating such retaliation claims.
As a practical matter, OSHA will not be litigating the possibly
meritorious cases. It will dismiss the non-meritorious cases and litigate
the meritorious cases. The whistleblower will have the burden of
litigating the possibly meritorious category, but she can now proceed
having some limited affirmation from OSHA.
2.

Increased Use of Punitive Sanctions

Punishment of wrongful behavior is traditionally a public concern,
and OSHA should emphasize existing tools for punishment to signal its
distinct public interest in combating retaliation. Punishment provides
the potential for retributive justice and deterrence, and numerous

151. See Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 383 (2d. Cir. 2008).
152. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012).
153. There is technically a fourth option, as the court handling the case may demand a decision
from the government when the government has not come to a decision. At this point the government
will file a “notice of no decision,” which effectively operates as a declination of intervention. It is
possible that this notice of no decision might be a deliberate DOJ choice. See R. Scott Oswald
& David L. Scher, DOJ’s New ‘No Decision’ Tactic in ‘Qui Tam’ Cases Leaves Counsel Guessing,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.bna.com/dojs-new-no-n17179893168/.
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statutes already provide an option for punitive sanctions.154 Even if
OSHA does not go so far as to increase the frequency of punitive
sanctions, simply discussing punitive sanctions more frequently will
highlight the public interest in retaliation cases.
OSHA’s current standards for considering punitive sanctions are
narrow and ill-advised. The proper standard should be recklessness: if
the defendant is reckless in allowing retaliation, then punitive sanctions
should apply. As long as a defendant company is aware of the substantial
and unjustifiable risk that it is retaliating against a whistleblower, it
should be liable for punitive damages.
This does not reflect current OSHA policy. Current policy is to apply
punitive damages based on two considerations: awareness of the law and
egregiousness of conduct.155 The first consideration effectively creates a
mistake of law defense to punitive damages: if the defendant is unaware
that the adverse employment action is illegal, punitive damages should
not apply. OSHA utilizes a recklessness standard as the minimum: if “the
official perceived there was a risk that the action was illegal but did not
stop or prevent the conduct.”156 The other alternative is egregious
conduct, examples of which include: (1) discharge accompanied by
harassment or blacklisting, (2) discharge based on association with a
whistleblower, and (3) employer violence.157
Mistake of law is an improper basis to exclude punitive retaliatory
liability. The proper standard should be whether the action itself is
reckless or knowing, rather than the defendant’s subjective awareness of
the illegality of the behavior. While some may perceive retaliation law to
be malum prohibitum, the fact that there is a common law right of action
against whistleblower retaliation suggests that the public interest in
protecting whistleblowers is sufficiently strong to create a presumption
against individuals who retaliate against whistleblowers.
A second step is to modify the good faith defense. The good faith
defense states that employers should not be liable for punitive damages
if “the managers were acting on their own and the [employer] had a clear
and effectively enforced policy against retaliation.”158 If the employer’s
antiretaliation policy were actually effective, it is unclear how the
whistleblower could actually suffer retaliation. This clause should not be
part of a defense. An employer as a corporate entity should be strictly
154. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2) (authorizing reinstatement, double back pay, interest on the
back pay and special damages); 49 U.S.C. § 31105(b)(3)(C) (2012) (sanctioning punitive damages up
to $250,000).
155. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 23, at 6-8.
156. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 23, at 6-8.
157. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 23, at 6-8.
158. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 23, at 6-9.
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liable for retaliation. In contrast, however, the second portion of the good
faith defense makes sense. This indicates that “[p]unitive damages may
not be appropriate if the respondent had a clear-cut policy against
retaliation which was subsequently used to mitigate the retaliatory
act.”159 Mitigation by the employer should count in favor of the employer.
B. STATUTORY REFORMS
Statutory reforms are the next major step to reaffirm the public
importance of whistleblower retaliation cases. OSHA can adjust its
investigatory process, but the existing statutory schemes are limiting.
First, the present statutory schemes focus excessively on private
compensation, leading courts to interpret the process as a private interest
in nature. Congress should instead focus on sanctions that deal with the
public harm of retaliation. Second, Congress should clarify the public
importance of delegating litigation responsibility. Rather than the
present ad hoc method of highlighting four prioritized statutory scheme,
Congress should explicitly analyze the whistleblower’s ability to pursue
the public interest in combating retaliation.
1.

Align Sanctions with the Public Interest

Most statutes focus on whistleblower compensation. Rather than
highlighting the whistleblower’s personal loss due to retaliation,
however, Congress should focus on society’s losses due to retaliation. The
public’s loss due to retaliation is loss of information regarding
wrongdoing: if whistleblowers are afraid to report wrongdoing due to
retaliation, society will not learn of the wrongdoing. Society’s loss is thus
linked more strongly with the substantive violation.
When a company violates the Clean Air Act and emits dangerous
pollutants into the environment, the DOJ and EPA fine the company at a
level that corresponds with the harm of the pollution. If that company
retaliates against a whistleblower who discloses evidence of the pollution
to the government, the loss to society corresponds more strongly with the
level of pollution.
An ideal system would calibrate the retaliation sanction with the
social harm from the retaliation. For example, if the substantive offense
causes $10 million in harm to society, the retaliation sanction will be a
fixed percentage of that harm. If the percentage is fixed at 10%, the
whistleblower could obtain $1 million from her former employer if she
successfully proves retaliation. The whistleblower receives the

159. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 23, at 6-9.
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$1 million regardless of her actual lost salary or other harms resulting
from the retaliation.
Tying the civil sanction for retaliation to the magnitude of the
substantive harm creates the opportunity for real deterrence of
retaliation. An employer considering retaliating against a whistleblower
will face a sanction commensurate with the harm of the wrongdoing. This
should give the employer pause before engaging in retaliation,
particularly given the general trend of employers being more likely to
engage in retaliation if their wrongdoing is more severe.
If the government retains the option but not the obligation to litigate
antiretaliation cases, Congress should recognize the additional private
effort required to litigate such cases without government support. For
example, the FCA acknowledges this burden on private enforcement by
increasing the bounty percentage paid to whistleblowers who do not have
the benefit of government intervention in their cases.160 This example is
from the substantive context for the FCA as opposed to the retaliation
context. As this Article argues, though, the antiretaliation portion is
similarly important in the detection and deterrence of the substantive
offenses.
Besides highlighting the public interest in retaliation, this statutory
proposal also improves the incentives for whistleblowers that litigate
against retaliation. Under the present system that focuses on
compensating a whistleblower’s job losses, there is no link in the
incentives for whistleblower antiretaliation litigation and the value of the
substantive wrongdoing. This present structural incentive disconnect
may result in both under and over investment in antiretaliation litigation.
A highly compensated but marginally effective employee may blow the
whistle on a trivial regulatory violation by her employer in order to gain
leverage against her employer for severance. Society may not benefit
from her raising the trivial regulatory violation, particularly if
investigating such a violation is costlier than any benefit from correcting
the violation. Nonetheless, the existing system may encourage her to over
invest in antiretaliation litigation because she personally suffers
substantial economic loss due to her high pay. Even though society would
not want to encourage this type of whistleblowing and thus would not
want to invest in deterring this “retaliation,” the present structure of
whistleblower compensation would encourage this litigation.
Similarly, the existing system may generate insufficient incentive for
low compensation employees revealing evidence of serious employer
wrongdoing. Under this scenario, it is important for society to learn of
the serious wrongdoing, but there will be little incentive for the
160. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012).
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whistleblower to invest in antiretaliation. The whistleblower herself will
only be entitled to recover her existing low compensation, and attorneys
working on her behalf will see very limited upside in aggressively
pursuing her case.
2.

Delegating Enforcement Responsibility

Specific statutes presently obligate OSHA to litigate on behalf of
specific whistleblowers. It must litigate retaliation cases falling under
TSCA, the SDWA,161 the AHERA,162 and the OSHA,163 but, as noted in
Subpart I.D., it is unclear why whistleblowers under these four statutes
should be privileged. If OSHA investigation finds that a whistleblower
faced illegal retaliation under SDWA, it must litigate that case,164 but if
the whistleblower faced illegal retaliation under CAA, it is not obligated
to do so.165
This Article proposes a systematic theory for evaluating who should
address enforcement of employer retaliation claims. If society’s interest
is in combating retaliation against whistleblowers, responsibility for
litigation should be allocated between OSHA and the whistleblower.
Congress should adopt a unified theory of assigning litigation
responsibility. In contrast to the Leon v. IDX decision, courts should first
understand that OSHA is litigating the public interest.166 Second, if
OSHA decides to delegate litigation to the whistleblower, courts should
understand that the whistleblower represents the public interest in
combating the retaliation.
The allocation of litigation responsibility is a principal-agent
problem: society, as the principal, has an interest in utilizing
whistleblowers to learn of wrongdoing, and society needs an agent to
litigate retaliation cases. The two major candidates for enforcement are
private enforcement, through the whistleblower, and public enforcement
by OSHA. As referenced in Subpart I.D., substantial literature discusses
the relative merits of public versus private enforcement.167 OSHA is
resource constrained and has other priorities demanding its attention,
while there are concerns about whether private parties can properly
represent the public interest.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 2651 (2012).
29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2012).
See 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i).
See 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2012).
See Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2008).
See supra note 91.
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This Article suggests that the whistleblower’s interest in the
substantive offense is the best reference point for her ability to represent
the public interest in combating retaliation. For example, if the
whistleblower is strongly concerned about breathing clean air at her work
place, she is a relatively trustworthy agent to litigate retaliation under the
Clean Air Act. OSHA should thus evaluate the strength of the
whistleblower’s interest in the substantive offense. If she has a strong
interest in the substantive offense, the government should feel
comfortable allowing her to litigate the civil antiretaliation claim. If she
has a weak interest in the substantive offense, however, the government
should prioritize public enforcement of the antiretaliation claim.
In practice, however, such a case-by-case evaluation would be
difficult and costly; the existing OSHA apparatus in addressing
whistleblower antiretaliation appears to be already strained. Instead,
Congress should estimate the expected whistleblower interest under each
federal statute. For example, under Section 11(c) of OSHA,
whistleblowers will likely have a strong interest in the primary right:
most whistleblowers will be employees who identify a safety violation at
their place of employment. These employees have a strong interest in a
safe working environment, and the government should be able to trust
those employees as good agents of the public interest. This does not mean
that Section 11(c) violations of OSHA do not merit public enforcement or
are not in the public interest. Rather, given limited enforcement
resources, public civil enforcement here is not as critical because there is
an adequate private alternative.
Similar to whistleblowers under Section 11(c) of OSHA,
whistleblowers under AHERA are likely to be good agents of the public
interest. The dangers of asbestos are widely recognized, and individuals
who blow the whistle about asbestos are likely to be the ones facing the
highest risk of exposure. The government should similarly feel
comfortable trusting those AHERA whistleblowers to litigate
antiretaliation claims.
In contrast, the False Claims Act prohibits fraud against the federal
government, but whistleblowers under the Act are typically not
employees of the federal government responsible for the public fisc.
Employees of government agencies routinely make decisions about how
to properly spend their budgets, and they have specialized knowledge as
to the costs and functions of their agency that surpass a typical taxpayer’s
knowledge. Government employees have a particularized interest in their
agency’s expenditures. In contrast, the whistleblowers have little
particularized interest in controlling government fraud; their interest is
likely similar to any other taxpayer. Therefore, without a strong interest
in the primary right, FCA whistleblowers are less reliable as agents of the
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public interest. The government should thus prioritize public
enforcement of FCA retaliation cases.
This is in direct contrast to the existing statutory scheme. Presently,
Congress requires public investigation and litigation for retaliation
against OSHA and AHERA whistleblowers,168 while the FCA makes no
such requirement of public enforcement.169 As a practical matter, OSHA
might simply adopt this principal-agent model in its internal case
prioritization system. More systemic reform would involve statutory
changes that formally reduce the obligation of OSHA to address, for
example, Section 11(c) retaliation cases and increase the obligation for
FCA retaliation cases. Rather than requiring OSHA investigation and
litigation of Section 11(c) cases, the statute should be amended to allow
optional investigation and litigation, similar to the existing language
under ISCA. In contrast, the FCA should be amended to incorporate
agency review of retaliation cases.
C. CHALLENGES WITH STATUTORY REFORMS
1. What to Do with Good Faith Claims
Whistleblowers who have a good faith claim of wrongdoing but lose
on their substantive claim would be disadvantaged by these statutory
changes. For example, a whistleblower might alert the federal
government to a CAA violation, but the federal government might decide
not to bring any enforcement action against the CAA violation for
political or national security reasons. Under a strict reading of this
proposal, this whistleblower would not receive any monetary award if she
faced retaliation. Effectively, whistleblowers bear the risk of being
incorrect regarding their substantive claim, and such risk might
encourage more careful investigation prior to blowing the whistle.
A less risky alternative is to give whistleblowers facing retaliation
two choices for compensation: to receive the higher of the existing
compensation regime or the proportional substantive value. Thus, a
whistleblower who provided valuable information to the government
could still obtain some compensation even if the government failed to
sanction the defendant. As under the present system, she could receive
as compensation for retaliation. Under this alternative, the whistleblower
would not be any worse off than under the present regime. The tradeoff,
however, is that this alternative does not discourage whistleblowers from
bringing weak substantive claims forward. As proposed in Subpart III.A.,
168. See 15 U.S.C. § 2651 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 660(C) (2012).
169. See SYLVIA, supra note 86.
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it remains important for OSHA to exercise judgment in dismissing
inappropriate retaliation claims from whistleblowers.
2. Deterrence Problems
A potential flaw with this private litigation proposal is the lack of
marginal deterrence: if there is a uniform civil sanction for retaliation,
will employers have the incentive to commit the worst forms of
retaliation? In some ways, this incentive effect may make sense: if the
penalty for egregious retaliation and mild retaliation are the same, the
employer might not feel pressure to avoid egregious retaliation efforts.
Nonetheless, it is likely that egregious retaliation is easier to prove in a
judicial setting, so employers may still be reluctant to pursue such
egregious efforts.
Rather, a clustering of employer efforts to commit non-cognizable
retaliation may occur. This form of retaliation is unpleasant to the
employee but not recognized by a court as illegal retaliation. For example,
giving an employee whistleblower the cold shoulder may make her feel
unwelcome, but courts may be reluctant to recognize that as behavior
meriting sanction.
This clustering effect may already exist, but the effect of the
clustering may be stronger if courts lack the ability to reduce the civil
sanction for retaliation. Courts may be more willing to blur the lines for
cognizable retaliation if they have flexibility to set the award amounts. If
the award amount is fixed, there may be severe hesitation at allowing
marginal behavior to result in a large, fixed sanction.
3.

Combined Bounty and Antiretaliation?

This statutory proposal borrows heavily from whistleblower bounty
programs. Federal whistleblower bounty systems typically grant a
percentage of the recovery to the whistleblower. For instance, a
whistleblower uncovering $10 million in fraud could gain 20% of that
recovery, amounting to a $2 million reward.170 These systems promote
whistleblowers as a faithful agent to the public concern for uncovering
fraud. They encourage whistleblowers to pursue larger cases of
wrongdoing, which are higher priorities for enforcement. In some ways,
this statutory proposal is an alternative method to introduce bounties
into a whistleblower scheme.
This proposal applies to statutes that do not offer a proportional
bounty for the substantive offense. Most whistleblower statutes fall into
this category. Statutes that have no proportional reward for substantive

170. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012).
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information benefit most from this proposal. In contrast, the FCA, for
example, already offers a proportional bounty for whistleblowers who
uncover fraud against the government.171 The importance of a
proportional bounty for antiretaliation based on the substantive offense
is unclear in this scenario, as the potential whistleblower already can
make a decision weighing the severity of the offense against the
possibility of suffering retaliation.
The FCA also includes a private right against retaliation.172 Because
the FCA already incorporates arguably good incentives to induce
whistleblowers to come forward representing the public interest, it is
likely that the antiretaliation provision does not need enhancement via a
proportional award. Moreover, if empirical evidence suggests that the
antiretaliation litigation tends to be frivolous, misused, or otherwise
induce antisocial behavior, it may be desirable to simply remove the
private right of retaliation from the FCA.
4.

Low Speed

Another downside of this proposal is its time-consuming nature:
antiretaliation litigation would have to wait upon the resolution of the
substantive offense to determine the sanction for retaliation. Although
the whistleblower could litigate her allegation of employer retaliation, the
compensation available for such litigation would be unclear at the start
of such litigation. The whistleblower and her attorneys might hesitate at
retaliation litigation without a better understanding of the financial
benefits from doing so.
This problem could be ameliorated by tying the retaliation sanction
to the good faith belief of the value of the substantive claim and allowing
immediate resolution of the retaliation claim. Courts could force the
parallel analysis of the substantive whistleblowing claim to determine
whether or not a whistleblower had a reasonable basis for her substantive
claim. As long as this is determined in her favor, she should be
immediately eligible for antiretaliation protection.
Early determination of a reasonable, good faith basis for the
substantive claim has its risks. First is the possibility of an early false
positive. It is possible that what appears to be a reasonable, good faith
basis for the substantive claim may actually be false or manufactured, but
additional research is required to discover this problem. For example, the
whistleblower may actually be the culprit or mastermind behind the
substantive offense, but she conceals her role and creates the apparent
171. See id.
172. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
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good faith evidence supporting her status as a whistleblower. A court
encouraging the government to first determine her good faith status
might result in antiretaliation protection for an individual that should be
relieved of her position. Thus, there is a risk of a company being stuck
with a malignant employee for longer than necessary, or a company
having to pay a malignant employee undeserved money.
The latter risk can be somewhat mitigated by allowing courts to
revisit the retaliation claim when the substantive research is completed,
but such ongoing litigation is admittedly costly, and it is possible that the
employee may cause additional harm or may spend the compensation
resulting in an uncollectable judgment for the former employer.
The other possibility is that an early determination of the
reasonable, good faith claim may be a false negative¾a rapid
determination that there is no reasonable, good faith basis for
whistleblowing when there actually is a serious problem that deserves
whistleblower attention. The false negative could cause multiple
problems. One problem would be that the government might terminate
its investigation at this stage. Because the government did not find
sufficient early evidence of a reasonable, good faith basis for
whistleblowing, it might decide that any subsequent research into the
substantive claim is not worthwhile. Thus, the government might miss
out on prosecuting a legitimate violation.
The more obvious problem is that the whistleblower would be
improperly denied relief under this scenario. This is a less serious
concern, though, since retaliation litigation in its present form can be
very lengthy, and during this time the whistleblower is not entitled to
immediate relief anyway.
Additionally, it seems unlikely that a court order to determine
reasonableness and good faith on the whistleblower’s part is going to
materially affect the government’s investigation¾the government
probably is determining its level of investment and priority in
investigating the whistleblower’s claims based on her initial evidence
anyway. Thus, this is an early stage analysis that the government will
conduct regardless of the court’s order; rather, the court order simply
pushes for disclosure of that initial early stage analysis.
D. REDUCE RELIANCE ON ANTIRETALIATION IN SUPPORT OF
WHISTLEBLOWING
A final consideration is that neither the government nor private
efforts may properly represent the public’s interests in enforcing
antiretaliation rights. After factoring in the costs of accurately evaluating
employer retaliation cases, it may be the case that other forms of
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encouraging whistleblowers are superior. Bounties and grants of
attorneys’ fees are alternative methods of encouraging whistleblowers,
and whistleblowers might pursue cases if there are sufficient bounties
involved, regardless of the risk of retaliation. A more thorough analysis
would consider the costs, benefits, and relative efficacy of these
alternatives to both reducing retaliation and improving whistleblower
participation.
In the narrower context of reducing retaliation, this Article
addresses two common issues that come up in existing whistleblower
programs: confidentiality and internal reporting requirements. This is
not an exhaustive list of alternatives, and these proposals could be used
in conjunction with any of the above reforms. These two issues have a
direct impact on potential retaliation, and OSHA and Congress would do
well to consider these options if reducing retaliation is a priority.
1.

Confidentiality

Confidentiality is a powerful tool that can mitigate risk of adverse
employment actions. If the employer does not discover the identity of the
whistleblower, retaliation against the whistleblower becomes rather
difficult. If government agencies view retaliation as a private issue
between employers and employees, however, they may expend little
effort in protecting the whistleblower’s identity.
The government has great capacity to protect the whistleblower’s
identity. The government is generally in control of the investigation
process and thus can shape what the employer learns of the allegations
as well as the source of the allegations. The government ostensibly has
multiple investigatory tools and can obfuscate the focus of wrongdoing.
Furthermore, the government can assist in privacy by urging courts to
keep identifying materials sealed.173 Many agencies, along with their
respective statutes, incorporate a general policy of attempting to provide
anonymity when whistleblowers so desire.174 Nonetheless, there are
exceptions. Whistleblower programs differ as to the level of secrecy they
provide to whistleblowers.

173. New York, for example, allows whistleblowers to keep records under seal if the state does not
act on the whistleblower’s allegations. See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190 (McKinney 2013).
174. See HELEN M. ALBERT, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION,
https://www.hudoig.gov/fraud-prevention/whistleblower-protection (last visited Apr. 21, 2018); SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS OF SECTION 21F OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 at 126–27, 131–32 (2011) https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/
34-64545.pdf; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA OIG HOTLINE, http://www2.epa.gov/office-inspector-gen
eral/epa-oig-hotline (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
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a. Short-Term Confidentiality
Some statutory regimes provide only for short-term confidentiality.
Government policy under the FCA, for example, does not provide
long-term secrecy for whistleblowers. While whistleblowers enjoy
temporary secrecy during the “under seal” portion of the government
investigation, standard DOJ policy is to unseal cases for transparency’s
sake after the investigation is complete.175 This is often against the
interests of both the defendant and the whistleblower: the defendant
does not want the existence of a government investigation made public,
and the whistleblower generally does not want her identity to be public.
Nonetheless, the policy interest in transparency is strong enough that the
government does not consider adverse employment actions to be a
sufficient basis for maintaining secrecy about the whistleblower’s
identity.
b. Confidentiality Unless There Is Enforcement
Another possibility is the provision of whistleblower confidentiality
unless there is resulting enforcement. The STAA mandates
non-disclosure of the whistleblower’s identity with one very large
exception: the statute mandates disclosure of the whistleblower’s identity
to the Attorney General if the matter is referred to the Attorney General
for enforcement.176 This is a rather limited provision of confidentiality, as
whistleblowers understandably expect enforcement if they believe they
are reporting wrongdoing. Nonetheless, this form of confidentiality at
least reduces some risk for the whistleblower. If the whistleblower is
wrong about the substantive allegation, she should be reasonably
protected from retaliation given this conditional confidentiality
provision.
c. No Confidentiality
Perhaps the most troubling for a potential whistleblower is the
complete lack of confidentiality. OSHA, for example, does not allow
anonymous whistleblowing. The whistleblower’s identity must be
provided to the employer.177 However, the Assistant Secretary of OSHA
may permit a claim of privilege to protect the whistleblower’s identity if
disclosure would “(1) [i]nterfere with an investigative or enforcement
175. See RACHEL REPLOGLE, ASS’N. OF CORP. COUNSEL, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL WHISTLEBLOWER
REGULATIONS, http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/whistleblowing.cfm (last visited
Apr. 21, 2018).
176. 49 U.S.C. § 31105(h) (2012).
177. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OSHA ONLINE WHISTLEBLOWER
COMPLAINT
FORM,
OMB
#1218-0236,
https://www.osha.gov/whistleblower/
WBComplaint.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
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action taken by OSHA under an authority delegated or assigned to OSHA
in this paragraph; (2) adversely affect persons who have provided
information to OSHA; or (3) deter other persons from reporting a
violation of law . . . .”178 This exception seems to be rather broad, and it is
difficult to imagine circumstances in which disclosure would not serve
one of those three standards.
2. Requirement of Internal Whistleblowing
While not directly addressing confidentiality, some whistleblower
regimes require “internal” whistleblowing to qualify for protection
against retaliation. For example, STAA states that to “qualify for
[antiretaliation] protection, the employee must have sought from the
employer, and been unable to obtain, correction of the hazardous safety
or security condition.”179 Such a requirement greatly reduces the
possibility of confidentiality, unless such problems are so widespread
that many employees are complaining about the same violations
internally. Despite the risks of identification, though, some studies
suggest that whistleblowers often conduct “internal” whistleblowing
prior to notifying an external authority.180
If Congress and government agencies view retaliation against
whistleblowers as a serious public problem rather than simply a private
loss to the employee, they may be less likely to require or pressure
whistleblowers into reporting internally. Nonetheless, if the
whistleblower-triggered investigation leads to punitive sanctions against
the employer, Congress may feel it is more equitable for the employer to
have a chance to correct the problems by first being notified by the
whistleblower.
CONCLUSION
Despite increasing reliance on whistleblowers in law and regulatory
enforcement, whistleblowers continue to face the risk of retaliation from
their employers. Congress has passed numerous laws mandating public
enforcement of antiretaliation statutes, suggesting that it recognizes the
public importance of combating whistleblower retaliation. These
legislative mandates have not been very successful, though, with courts
and agencies viewing retaliation as a primarily private problem. This
178. 65 Fed. Reg. 50017 (Aug. 16, 2000).
179. § 31105(a)(2).
180. See summary in MICELI ET AL., supra note 43, at 8; see also Marcia Parmerlee Miceli & Janet
P. Near, The Relationships Among Beliefs, Organizational Position, and Whistle-Blowing Status:
A Discriminant Analysis, 27 ACAD. OF M GMT. J. 687, 693 (1984) (eighty-eight percent of reported
external whistleblowers also reported internal whistleblowing).
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private problem view is understandable given public resource constraints
and unclear priorities, but these decisions have negatively impacted the
effectiveness of the legislative regime.
In the short term, OSHA can highlight the public importance of
whistleblower retaliation cases by adjusting its priorities in fulfilling its
legislative mandate to investigate. By prioritizing the dismissal of
non-meritorious cases, OSHA can emphasize the remaining public
interest in the remaining cases, even if OSHA has insufficient resources
to fully investigate those remaining cases.
As a broader approach requiring statutory reforms, this Article
proposed a principal-agent framework that evaluates a whistleblower’s
suitability as an enforcement agent for her right against employer
retaliation. This framework provides guidance in understanding how
agencies should prioritize retaliation enforcement. Private enforcement
makes sense when the whistleblower’s interests in preventing the
employer’s wrongdoing overlap with the public’s interests. The Secretary
of Labor and its delegates should thus prioritize public enforcement of
retaliation cases in which the whistleblower’s private interests do not
match the public’s interests.
Limited public enforcement resources will still leave many cases for
private resolution. Proper delegation of antiretaliation for private
enforcement should move beyond a simplistic view of antiretaliation as
compensation for a whistleblower’s individual economic loss. Instead,
this Article proposed that whistleblower statutes incorporate an
antiretaliation claim whose sanction is based on the severity of the
substantive offense. This linkage will highlight the public interest in
individual retaliation cases. Furthermore, this expanded sanction will
allow private enforcement to exert deterrent power over employers
considering retaliation against whistleblowers. It will encourage
whistleblowers to pursue legitimate allegations of serious wrongdoing, as
they will have increased assurance of payment in case of retaliation.
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